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Continuous improvements to core computing technologies over the 
previous decade have generated an explosive growth in artificial 
intelligence (AI) research and development, facilitated the rapid 
integration of AI computing systems into countless fields and industries, 
and spurred billions of dollars in private and public investment into the 
growing market for increasingly specialized AI products.1 These recent 
advances in AI programing have generated considerable discussion and 
debate both within and outside of the legal community. The significant 
body of early AI legal theory has largely focused on the speculative 
implications presented by the theoretical invention of a fully autonomous, 
freethinking AI machine, a program capable of truly independent 
“thought” and action.2 However, while AI technology is constantly 
advancing, a fully autonomous AI program presently remains a thing of 
dreams and fiction;3 despite the ever-growing and increasingly diverse 
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 1. See The Dawn of Artificial Intelligence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space, Sci. & 
Competitiveness of Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 114th Cong. 26–31, 114–562, 
(2016) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Greg Brockman, Co-founder and Chief Technology 
Officer of OpenAI, a non-profit AI research company). While there are many expert voices in the field 
of AI and computer science worthy of citation for the programming principles that I reference in this 
Comment, I often rely herein on the expert speakers from these Hearings, in no small part because 
theirs are the voices speaking directly to our nation’s lawmakers about these issues. 
 2. Whether we attribute this persistent legal focus on AI autonomy to the largely theoretical 
nature of the science, to the general cultural fascination that continues to surround such technology, 
or to some other impetus, the idea of a fully autonomous AI has clearly captivated the legal community 
and continues to influence its discussions. 
 3. See generally Cade Metz, Tech Giants Are Paying Huge Salaries for Scarce Artificial 
Intelligence Talent, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/tech-
giants-are-paying-huge-salaries-for-scarce-artificial-intelligent-talent/?utm_source=The+Seattle+ 
1202 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:1201 
body of real-world AI programming, discussions on AI legal theory 
remain captivated by the questions of AI autonomy and agency.4 As AI 
technology outpaces the law, I predict that gaps in the existing legal 
framework will be insufficient to deter misconduct and negligence, or to 
reimburse those harmed by the rising tide of this relatively new 
technology. 
The term “artificial intelligence” broadly serves to describe a diverse 
body of programs and systems with greatly differing functions and 
capacities. However, this Comment focuses on AI programs that are 
intended to interact with, learn from, and adapt their performance to their 
users. This is a specific capability and process that I will hereinafter refer 
to as “reinforcement learning.”5 As AI products with reinforcement 
learning capabilities enter the consumer market, I believe that it is 
inevitable that user interactions with these new AI programs will give rise 
to a new body of AI-based products liability claims. Unfortunately, it is 
unclear whether the traditional products liability framework that will 
presumptively govern these new claims can continue to protect 
consumers’ rights and interests without asphyxiating what has already 
established itself as a vital industry of incalculable social utility and 
economic potential.6 Moreover, increasing product complexity is not only 
likely to give rise to increasing costs of AI-based products liability 
                                                     
Times&utm_campaign=a3cf1f3636-Morning_Brief_10_24_2017&utm_medium=email&utm_term= 
0_5beb38b61e-a3cf1f3636-122198665%20 [https://perma.cc/86V5-Y3UH]. 
 4. See David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial 
Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 120 (2014) (“Today’s machines, as path-breaking as they are, all 
have a common feature that is critical in assessing liability. In each case, the machine functions and 
makes decisions in ways that can be traced directly back to the design, programming, and knowledge 
humans embedded in the machine. . . . Where the hand of human involvement in machine decision-
making is so evident, there is no need to reexamine liability rules.”). But see generally Bryant Walker 
Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (2017) (for a distinction 
regarding product liability for self-driving vehicles). 
 5. For the purposes of this Comment, I use the term “reinforcement learning” to identify those 
AI programs that acquire new data through their interactions with their users. Though I believe that 
the term “reinforcement learning” fairly captures this iterative process, this definition is not universally 
used throughout the field of AI. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 13 (statement by Dr. Horvitz where he 
uses the term “reinforcement learning” to refer to AI programmed to perform physical tasks) 
(“[Reinforcement learning explores] the challenges of enabling systems to do active exploration in 
simulated and real worlds that are aimed at endowing the systems with the ability to make predictions 
and to perform physical actions successfully. Such work typically involves the creation of training 
methodologies that enable a system to explore on its own, to perform multiple trials at tasks, and to 
learn from these experiences.”). 
 6. NARRATIVE SCI., OUTLOOK ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE ENTERPRISE 6 (2016) 
(where a survey of 235 respondent businesses about their use and development of AI services and 
technology found that 62% of respondents without current AI systems indicated they would deploy 
AI systems by 2018); see also Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Sen. Ted Cruz citing a 2016 
Accenture report that predicted AI has the capability to “double annual economic growth rates by 2035 
and boost labor productivity by up to 40 percent”). 
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litigation, but I believe that reinforcement learning AI programs may 
subvert the consumer protection goals that are central to the traditional 
products liability framework.7 
The products liability problem posed by non-autonomous 
reinforcement learning AI programs is inherent to their design. 
Specifically, reinforcement learning AI are programmed for self-directed, 
aftermarket adaptation in response to new data.8 As the AI acquires new 
data through interactions with the consumer-user, it subsequently 
incorporates this data into existing pattern analysis processes to revise 
existing functions or develop new ones, enabling the AI to more efficiently 
and effectively execute its core operations.9 I argue that this new and 
unique capacity for intended aftermarket adaptation in response to data 
generated through AI–consumer interactions creates the potential for 
unintended and unforeseen injuries that were not within the AI system’s 
capabilities at the time of purchase.10 Through passive or active interaction 
with their reinforcement learning AI programs, consumers in future AI 
products liability actions may themselves provide the specific data that, 
when integrated by their AI’s reinforcement learning program into its field 
of potential product actions, contributes to their immediate injury and 
subsequent products liability claim. In such instances, while the 
manufacturer will be responsible for providing the foundational 
programming with the express capability for aftermarket adaptation, the 
consumer will be responsible for providing the specific, aftermarket data 
that generates their own injury. Simply stated, these AI may both function 
and be used as intended but still cause an injury that neither the consumer 
nor the manufacturer foresaw—an injury that was not within the product’s 
original capabilities at the time of purchase. 
This creates a liability gap. Where designed, aftermarket AI–
consumer interaction is intended to, and does, alter the product, should 
manufactures still be liable for all resulting injuries? At the time of 
                                                     
 7. See infra note 42. 
 8. See, e.g., Maruerite E. Gerstner, Liability Issues with Artificial Intelligence Software, 33 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 239, 242–44 (1993). 
 9. Id. For a straightforward example, consider a search engine’s predictive text function. The 
program incorporates, refines, and develops new search suggestions based on the user’s past searches. 
The more the consumer uses the search function and interacts with the search engine, the more data 
the program acquires, and the more specific the program’s suggestions become. 
 10. Consider the following example, which is meant to illustrate the general operation of the 
reinforcement learning process. An AI product is manufactured and purchased in its original form, 
state A. After interacting with the consumer, the AI product acquires and integrates new data provided 
by the consumer and subsequently begins refining and altering its internal processes (the reinforcement 
learning process) and “evolves” to state B. Continued consumer interactions will generate more new 
data, which the AI will continue to analyze and either integrate or discard. Barring pre-programmed 
restrictions or general computer processing limitations, this iterative process will cycle onward and 
the AI will become more and more distinct from its original form at the time of purchase. 
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purchase, when an AI program only possesses the potential to evolve, 
through individual consumer provided data, into a dangerous or injurious 
product, should products liability law treat that AI program as legally 
defective? If so, what standards should be used to determine whether an 
AI manufacturer is liable for failing to mitigate directly or indirectly 
against the possibility of future injuries caused by specific aftermarket 
consumer alterations? I believe that waiting and allowing these issues to 
be addressed on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction or product-by-product basis 
(which seems increasingly possible, given recent investments and 
developments in automated driving technology) has the potential to leave 
both consumer-plaintiffs and manufacturer-defendants high and dry. 
In this Comment, I argue that the unique relationship between 
manufacturers, consumers, and their reinforcement learning AI systems 
challenges existing products liability law models. These traditional models 
inform how to identify and apportion liability between manufacturers and 
consumers while exposing litigants to low-dollar tort remedies with 
inherently high-dollar litigation costs.11 Rather than waiting for AI 
autonomy, the political and legal communities should be proactive and 
generate a liability model that recognizes how new AI programs have 
already redefined the relationship between manufacturer, consumer, and 
product while challenging the legal and financial burden of prospective 
consumer-plaintiffs and manufacturer-defendants. 
I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND REINFORCEMENT LEARNING SYSTEMS 
A. Trial and Error in Reinforcement Learning Systems Development 
On Wednesday, March 23, 2016, Microsoft unveiled its newest 
creation: an online chat-bot named Tay,12 an AI program designed to talk 
like a teen and engage with users aged eighteen to twenty-four across 
multiple social media platforms for “cultural entertainment.”13 To 
                                                     
 11. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW. 
INST. 1998) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS] (“[Existing product liability models, such 
as strict liability, in addition to encouraging greater investment in product safety,] discourages the 
consumption of defective products by causing the purchase price of products to reflect, more than 
would a rule of negligence, the costs of defects . . . . Because manufacturers invest in quality control 
at consciously chosen levels, their knowledge that a predictable number of flawed products will enter 
the marketplace entails an element of deliberation about the amount of injury that will result from their 
activity.”). 
 12. Hope King, After Racist Tweets, Microsoft Muzzles Teen Chat Bot Tay, CNN (Mar. 24, 
2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/24/technology/tay-racist-microsoft/?ild=EL [https://perma.cc/ 
4FDN-4LEL]. 
 13. Peter Lee, Learning from Tay’s Introduction, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Mar. 25, 2016), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/03/25/learning-tays-introduction/ [https://perma.cc/6TQWM2 
AY]. 
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personalize the user experience and facilitate the AI’s development, 
Microsoft programmed Tay to learn through its conversations with users 
and incorporate its learned language in subsequent user communications.14 
Unfortunately, despite extensive testing, multiple program filters, 
numerous user studies, and a prior successful launch of a comparable 
program to over 40 million users in China, within the first twenty-four 
hours of the AI coming online, Tay’s conversations became grossly 
offensive and racist.15 By Thursday, March 24, 2016, only a day after 
Tay’s unveiling, Microsoft was forced to take Tay offline and to issue a 
public apology, citing their extensive efforts to prevent such an event 
while also attributing the incident to a coordinated attack by a subset of 
people who exploited a vulnerability in the AI’s programming.16 
The idea of a rogue AI has captivated the imaginations of countless 
scientists, writers, and producers of science fiction.17 Tay’s failure is 
illustrative of a longstanding fear: the capacity of an AI system to function 
as programmed but with unintended and terrible results.18 While Microsoft 
(or any producer of an inadvertently racist AI) would naturally be inclined 
to object to the assertion that Tay “functioned as intended,” such 
opposition reflects only a natural criticism of the unforeseen results but 
not a proper criticism for the technical operation of the AI programming 
by which those results were generated.19 While in the immediate context 
this may appear to be a distinction without significant consequence, 
                                                     
 14. Lee, supra note 13 (“We stress-tested Tay under a variety of conditions, specifically to make 
interacting with Tay a positive experience. Once we got comfortable with how Tay was interacting 
with users, we wanted to invite a broader group of people to engage with her. It’s through increased 
interaction where we expected to learn more and for the AI to get better and better.”). 
 15. King, supra note 12. Before Microsoft took Tay offline and censored the AI’s account, 
hundreds of the offensive tweets had already been saved and shared by users. The samples reported 
by CNN included: “‘N——— like @d [sic] should be hung! #BlackLivesMatter’; ‘I f——— hate 
feminists and they should all die and burn in hell’; [and] ‘Hitler was right I hate the jews.’” Id. 
 16. Lee, supra note 13. 
 17. The concept of an autonomous AI—malevolent or otherwise—has appeared in a multitude 
of media and influenced the public consciousness for more than half a century. See, e.g., ISAAC 
ASIMOV, I, ROBOT (1950); 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures 1968). 
 18. Nonprofit AI research company OpenAI recently made the rare decision not to publicly 
release its latest project, a new AI software capable of advanced text-generation, citing fears for how 
it may be used and noting the lack of legal limitations on the use of such technology generally. Rachel 
Metz, This AI is so Good at Writing that Its Creators Won’t Let You Use It, CNN (Feb. 18, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/18/tech/dangerous-ai-text-generator/index.html [https://perma.cc/KA 
7R-WR7F]. 
 19. Lee, supra note 13. Tay was designed to interact with Twitter users, learn their language, 
and integrate that learned speech into subsequent conversations to provide a more effective and 
genuine communication experience. Id. The AI program performed exactly as designed; the critical 
“flaw” was both the influx of deliberately offensive user input and the failure of Microsoft to properly 
account for the likelihood of such user input or limit Tay’s vocabulary. Id. 
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accurately understanding and identifying the source of errant program 
behavior has important liability implications. 
B. Defining Artificial Intelligence 
Before addressing the underlying products liability questions that are 
central to this Comment, it is necessary to first establish a baseline 
understanding of the design and capabilities of the specific systems at the 
heart of this discussion. Broadly, the concept of AI encompasses all 
systems and programs that involve computers learning how to complete 
tasks traditionally done by humans.20 However, the current landscape of 
AI technology is already so diverse in form and function that offering a 
generalized definition for AI can only serve as a starting point.21 
The heart of AI programming is creating or enabling self-sufficient 
machine learning. The AI system’s cognitive computing functions are 
roughly modeled after human learning; the AI processes the data that it 
receives, identifies patterns, and then creates and incorporates new 
patterns, which allows the system to test various hypotheses and find new 
solutions.22 Presently, most AI programs in or entering the commercial 
market are “under-the-hood” systems: subsidiary programs specifically 
designed to facilitate principal programs to operate more efficiently.23 
Consequently, despite the relative prevalence of AI, it is common for many 
users of AI, from businesses to individual consumers, to rely on these 
systems without understanding how prevalent the technology has 
become.24 Thus, while the average consumer may “understand” AI 
technology through products like Amazon’s Alexa or in the context of new 
self-driving technologies, many industries use the term AI to more broadly 
                                                     
 20. Julie Sobowale, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the Legal Profession, ABA J. 
(Apr. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_artificial_intelligence_is_transformi 
ng_the_legal_profession [https://perma.cc/UHM2-R53X]. 
 21. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 7. AI programs are capable of performing an incredibly diverse 
set of functions, from common recommendation engines and text mining, to machine learning systems 
and modeling, to predictive and prescriptive analytics, the depth and diversity of these programs is 
only increasing. See NARRATIVE SCI., supra note 6, at 6. However, despite the increasing diversity of 
AI systems, one element remains central to the rapid growth of AI technology: advancements in core 
computer processing power. Hearings, supra note 1, at 3. 
 22. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 9; Gerstner, supra note 8. Stated alternatively, unlike 
traditional software, where programmers specify predetermined outcomes that serve to explicitly 
confine the program’s output to a limited set of possible solutions, AI programs are expressly designed 
to identify and develop original solutions. 
 23. Hearings, supra note 1, at 9 (“Many applications of AI execute ‘under the hood’, including 
methods that perform machine learning and planning to enhance the functioning of computer operation 
systems or to better retrieve and rank search results.”). 
 24. NARRATIVE SCI., supra note 6, at 5 (stating that while 62% said they do not use AI 
technologies in the workplace, such as for automating manual tasks, 88% of those same businesses 
use technologies that rely on AI techniques). 
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refer to predictive or prescriptive analytics systems or machine learning 
programs.25 
Dr. Eric Horvitz, while testifying at a 2016 hearing before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Space, Science, and Competitiveness, explained to 
Congress that “[m]ost machine learning is referred to as supervised 
learning. . . . [D]ata is directly or indirectly tagged by people who provide 
a learning system with specific labels, such as the goals or intentions of 
people, or health outcomes.”26 Conversely, unsupervised learning is when 
machines “learn without human-authored labels.”27 Simply stated, with 
unsupervised learning systems, human developers provide the 
foundational data to the AI program, but the AI program is empowered to 
define and categorize the data for itself.28 
While reinforcement learning AI programs are not fully autonomous 
principals by any stretch, they are produced with the unique ability to 
identify, categorize, and incorporate or exclude new data.29 In theory, any 
programmer, when given enough time, is capable of developing a nearly 
limitless set of restrictions to prevent an unsupervised reinforcement 
learning program from incorporating “bad” data, which is pre-determined 
to be unsuitable or undesirable. For example, consider if Microsoft had 
pre-programmed specific word restrictions to prevent Tay from 
identifying and incorporating racist or bigoted speech as “usable 
language.” However, even with the availability of programming 
restrictions, the nearly infinite body of potential data inputs over hundreds 
of thousands of various AI–consumer interactions render any attempt at 
creating a “perfect” program impractical, if not entirely impossible.30 
                                                     
 25. Hearings, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
 26. Id. at 13 (internal emphases removed). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. The AI program is entrusted with the ability to distinguish between useful and unsuitable 
data, as well as the ability to continuously develop new patterns of analysis based on all available data, 
which further determines how the program functions. Id.  
 29. Manufacturers of reinforcement learning AI programs exercise limited control over the 
character of the specific data inputs that the system will use over its lifetime. As the AI program 
identifies existing patterns and subsequently establishes new, organic patterns—derived from 
aftermarket consumer data inputs—it will invariably become more challenging to attribute undesirable 
AI actions to a fault present in the manufacturer’s original programming. See Vladeck, supra note 4, 
at 121–22. 
 30. See Gerstner, supra note 8, at 243 (discussing how programmers and manufacturers cannot 
practically eliminate all risk but must determine what risk level is acceptable to maximize usefulness 
and minimize liability). Inherently, the more restrictions placed on the system, the more limited the 
system’s ability to generate solutions becomes, so precision is preferable. However, any and every 
product development process necessarily has a tipping point, where expending further resources in 
pursuit of perfect precision is fiscally inefficient. Alternatively, programmers erring on the side of 
caution (or programming efficiency) could impose non-targeted, general restrictions—but again, this 
comes at the cost of limiting possible solutions. Manufacturers must find a balance with such 
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C. The Limits of “Autonomy” as Applied to Artificial Intelligence 
Products Liability 
Despite the general consensus that AI technology still has vastly 
significant ground to cover before manufacturers of AI systems can begin 
to seriously claim the creation of an actual autonomous machine, the 
language of agency and autonomy is pervasive in the current AI legal 
analysis.31 While the discussion of the theoretical legal impacts of 
autonomous AI is not inherently problematic, these discussions of AI 
autonomy and liability are often accompanied by blanket assertions that 
traditional liability models are adequate to address the issues presented by 
non-autonomous AI.32 However, these assertions can only survive based 
on such overbroad generalizations about the character of these AI 
programs under an agent–principal analysis. 
Inarguably, the theoretical advent of a fully autonomous AI program 
poses numerous and challenging questions that our legal, political, social, 
and programming communities may one day soon be required to address. 
As Professor David Vladeck identified, the idea of a completely 
autonomous AI program—a machine capable of analysis, decision-
making, and action fully independent of those means originally 
contemplated by the machine’s creators—naturally frustrates traditional 
agency and instrumentality theories which transfer liability to either the 
user or manufacturer of the product giving rise to an injury.33 Where there 
is a legally identifiable entity accountable for the AI’s actions, such as an 
agent or instrument of the manufacturer or user, a fully autonomous AI, 
by its very nature, would act like a traditional principal precisely because 
it would be functioning autonomously.34 Unfortunately, the parallel 
assertion that is often made—that the actions of a non-autonomous and 
non-principal AI may still be effectively governed by existing products 
liability principals—simply fails to account for the complexities inherent 
in the current body of AI programming and the unique relationships that 
can now exist between manufactures, consumers, and AI systems.35 
In his recent analysis of autonomous AI systems and manufacturer 
liability, Vladeck contends that “the key conceptual question that 
autonomous thinking machines will pose is whether it is fair to think of 
                                                     
restrictions while also recognizing that mitigating all undesirable outcomes is simply impossible 
because of the unforeseeable nature of all the data. 
 31. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 4; cf. Gerstner, supra note 8, at 268 (concluding that strict 
liability standards should be imposed on commercially marketed AI). 
 32. See Vladeck, supra note 4, at 121. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. In such an instance, an autonomous AI would be acting independently, similar to a simple 
tortfeasor. 
 35. Id. 
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them as agents of some other individual or entity, or whether the legal 
system will need to decide liability issues on a basis other than agency.”36 
In response to the question of what liability rules should govern artificially 
intelligent machines in the products liability context, Vladeck posits that 
there is no present justification for treating such machines any differently, 
beyond exploring higher standards of care for manufacturers.37 
Further embracing that the central issue underlying AI systems’ 
liability is the question of autonomy, Vladeck relies on a traditional agent–
principal analysis to identify and apportion liability between AI-
manufacturers and consumers38: 
In each case, the machine functions and makes decisions in ways that 
can be traced directly back to the design, programming, and 
knowledge humans embedded in the machine. . . . 39 
 Where the hand of human involvement in machine decision-
making is so evident, there is no need to reexamine liability 
rules. . . . [T]hese machines, notwithstanding their sophistication, 
have no attribute of legal personhood. They are agents or instruments 
of other entities that have legal capacity of individuals, corporations, 
or other legal “persons” that may be held accountable under the law 
for their actions.40 
. . . The first generation of fully autonomous machines—perhaps 
driver-less cars and fully independent drone aircraft—will have the 
capacity to act completely autonomously. They will not be tools used 
by humans; they will be machines deployed by humans that will act 
independently of direct human instruction.41 
However, I believe that by perfunctorily concluding that liability 
questions surrounding non-autonomous systems will continue to fall on 
the shoulders of manufacturers; legal theorists and policymakers run the 
considerable risk of overlooking how the unique, evolutionary character 
of reinforcement learning AI systems may soon upend the traditional 
consumer–product relationship, threatening the traditional products 
                                                     
 36. Id. at 122. 
 37. See id. at 127. 
 38. Id. at 150 (“So long as we can conceive of these machines as ‘agents’ of some legal person 
(individual or virtual), our current system of products liability will be able to address the legal issues 
surrounding their introduction without significant modification. But the law is not necessarily 
equipped to address the legal issues that will start to arise when the inevitable occurs and these 
machines cause injury, but when there is no ‘principal’ directing the actions of the machine.”). 
 39. Id. at 120. 
 40. Id. at 120–21. 
 41. Id. 
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liability framework along with many of its underlying policy goals: 
namely, consumer protection.42 
II. APPLYING PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW TO REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
A. Products Liability Law and Emerging Technologies 
Now that we have further outlined the quality of the non-autonomous 
AI systems at issue, it is time to address the complications that arise when 
attempting to apply traditional products liability theories to products with 
reinforcement learning AI capabilities. Due to the relative infancy of 
reinforcement learning AI consumer products, case law specifically 
addressing the liability of manufacturers of AI under a products liability 
standard is virtually non-existent. Accordingly, to better assess the 
potential legal developments of AI products liability law, it is necessary to 
review the current state of products liability law generally and briefly 
consider its implications in a rising field of importance: automated driving 
programs. 
Due to the recent advances and increased publicity surrounding new 
developments in automated driving technology, there has been 
considerable discussion addressing liability for manufacturers of 
automated driving AI.43 However, there are many reasons that 
manufacturers, consumers, and courts should be wary of allowing 
automated driving technology liability discussions to dictate the 
development of parallel liability models for other forthcoming consumer–
AI product interactions. Both the historical intricacies underpinning 
courts’ treatment of liability issues for automotive related torts and the 
inextricable issues raised by the ever-present automotive insurance 
industry make the automotive industry an outlier in the field of emerging 
                                                     
 42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 2 cmt. a (stating that “[t]he rule for 
manufacturing defects . . . imposes liability whether or not the manufacturer’s quality control efforts 
satisfy standards of reasonableness. . . . On the premise that tort law serves the instrumental function 
of creating safety incentives, imposing strict liability on manufacturers for harm caused by 
manufacturing defects encourages greater investment in product safety than does a regime of fault-
based liability under which, as a practical matter, sellers may escape their appropriate share of 
responsibility. Some courts and commentators also have said that strict liability discourages the 
consumption of defective products by causing the purchase price of products to reflect, more than 
would a rule of negligence, the costs of defects.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4; JOHN VILLASENOR, BROOKINGS INST., PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
AND DRIVERLESS CARS: ISSUES AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR LEGISLATION (Apr. 24, 2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/products-liability-and-driverless-cars-issues-and-guiding-
principles-for-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/HVR3-N94N]. 
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AI liability.44 While forthcoming changes in automotive liability resulting 
from advances in automated driving will likely serve as one of the first 
trial grounds for AI-based tort litigation, it does not serve as an ideal vector 
for an analysis of AI products liability generally given the subject-specific 
intricacies that make automotive tort litigation so unique. Rather than 
allowing the insurance driven field of automotive torts to passively co-opt 
the still emergent legal discussions of AI liability, proactive legislative 
action could not only serve to address many of the concerns raised in this 
Comment, but also ensure that these legal remedies are efficiently tailored 
to the unique AI programs in question. 
B. Proving Design Defects in Reinforcement Learning 
 Artificial Intelligence 
Generally, a manufacturer is liable under products liability law if 
there was a defect in the manufacturing process, a defect in the design, or 
a failure to provide sufficient and reasonable warning.45 While there are 
multiple standards under which a reinforcement learning AI manufacturer 
may be found liable, design defect claims arguably pose the greatest 
challenge for traditional products liability models.46 Specifically 
                                                     
 44. In automotive-tort litigation, a considerable percentage of victims and defendants rely on 
insurance policies to satisfy their respective recovery and liability questions. See Smith, supra note 4, 
at 33 (“A crash victim who has automotive, health, or life insurance might seek payment directly from 
the provider of that insurance. The victim may additionally or alternatively seek payment from an 
insurer that provides liability coverage to a would-be defendant. . . . Largely because of automotive 
insurance, the vast majority of crashes are handled without any litigation.”). 
 45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 2 (“A product is defective when, at the 
time of sale or distribution, it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective 
because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product: (a) contains a manufacturing defect when 
the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the 
preparation and marketing of the product; (b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm 
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and 
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe; (c) is defective because 
of inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or 
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.”). 
 46. I focus primarily on design defect claims because the issues raised in these cases will directly 
concern litigation regarding intended but unforeseen uses of the product’s AI systems, as opposed to 
allegations that the programming itself was flawed, resulting in errant results. Where an AI product 
acts contradictory to its programing or its advertised or warranted function, traditional products 
liability models will still suffice to apportion liability. See Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors 
of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 437 (2008) (citing David 
Polin, Proof of Manufacturer’s Liability for Defective Software, in 68 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
PROOF OF FACTS 3d 333, 347 (2002)) (“No reported decision has unequivocally held that a software 
vendor has breached an express warranty. There are three possible reasons for this: ‘First, software 
manufacturers scrupulously avoid making express claims that software will perform any particular 
tasks, although they freely claim that their products have nearly mystical qualities. Secondly, any 
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addressing how manufacturing defects (which he calls “production 
defects”) and design defects can arise in the computer software context, 
Steven J. Frank offers the following synthesis of software products 
liability law: 
A product is said to be flawed if it contains “an abnormality or a 
condition that was unintended, and makes the product more 
dangerous than it would have been as intended.” Production defects 
may be introduced into a computer program during the mass copying 
process. Because such an item has failed to meet the manufacturer’s 
own specifications, proof of defectiveness is reduced to a relatively 
easy matter of comparison. 
This contrasts sharply with proof of unreasonable danger in a 
product’s design. In such cases, the plaintiff’s burden of proof often 
differs little from that faced in an ordinary negligence action. Courts 
have experimented with a plethora of tests to combine the goals of 
consumer protection with encouragement of technological advance. 
The consumer contemplation test, for example, examines whether the 
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would 
anticipate; the danger-utility test weighs the danger inherent in a 
particular product with the benefits it produces. A design defect may 
also be introduced by failure to warn about a risk or hazard related to 
the way a product was designed. The standard in these types of cases 
is usually straightforward negligence, necessitating proof that a 
defendant “knew or should have known in the exercise of ordinary 
care of the risk or hazard about which he failed to warn.”47 
Notably, Frank identifies the inherent difficulties that arise in 
litigating design defect cases, specifically in the case of computer 
software: 
Computer software may raise especially nettlesome questions. 
Unlike most products, computer programs written for broad 
consumer audiences are suited to a variety of applications and tasks. 
The degree of danger to which users are exposed is not an intrinsic 
property of the program, but rather depends on the particular use to 
which it is put. Normally, manufacturers are held liable only for harm 
arising from ordinary and reasonably foreseeable uses. The difficulty 
with this premise is that tort doctrine has developed around a concept 
of foreseeability which contemplates some type of misuse. It is 
unclear whether courts will apply this reasoning to uses of a program 
                                                     
express promises are inevitably disclaimed in licensing agreements. Thirdly, it is generally agreed that 
software cannot be expected to perform perfectly, so such warranties as exist will be interpreted 
somewhat loosely.’”). 
 47. Steven J. Frank, Tort Adjudication and the Emergence of Artificial Intelligence Software, 21 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 623, 637–38 (1987). 
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which are wholly unforeseeable yet to which the product is entirely 
suited.48 
Design defect claims involving reinforcement learning AI programs 
will pose particularly unique challenges given that both the user and the 
AI control the systems that will produce these injuries.49 As previously 
noted, one of the unique characteristics of reinforcement learning AI 
systems from a products liability context is that these AI are expressly 
programmed for aftermarket AI–consumer interaction and alteration.50 
Consequently, at the time of purchase, the AI program only possesses the 
potential to evolve into a dangerous or injurious product in response to the 
consumer’s own usage. Accordingly, a successful design defect claim 
against a manufacturer would require that the AI was legally defective, not 
based on an actual existing danger (the immediate capability of the 
program to commit the injurious action that gave rise to the consumers 
products liability claim), but the manufacturer’s failure to mitigate against 
a potentially dangerous aftermarket evolution.51 The characterization of 
the product’s condition at the time of sale—namely, whether it is 
immediately dangerous or inert—is just one of the many potential issues 
presented. To better capture the potential liability gap posed by emergent 
AI products, the following three sections explore how existing design 
defect principles may struggle to account for the unique consumer–AI 
relationship giving rise to potential products liability claims. 
1. The Risk-Utility and Consumer Expectations Test 
Though there is minor state-by-state variation, there are generally 
two tests for determining whether a product is defective due to an 
unreasonably dangerous (or unreasonably safe) design: the risk-utility test 
and the consumer expectations test.52 Notwithstanding, both of these tests 
are insufficient to address the complexity of AI products that evolve with 
AI–consumer interaction. 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts provides a succinct description of 
the risk-utility test: 
Under risk-utility balancing the likelihood and magnitude of 
foreseeable harm is balanced against the burden of precaution against 
                                                     
 48. Id. at 638–39. 
 49. While the user will still possess some legally discernable degree of operational control, the 
AI system executes countless actions, effectively independent of any immediate user supervision or 
awareness. See supra note 45. 
 50. See Gerstner, supra note 8 and discussion therein on after-market adaptation. 
 51. See infra Sections II.B.2 and II.B.3 (discussing the foreseeability of aftermarket consumer 
alterations). 
 52. For a state-by-state analysis, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 2 cmt. d. 
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the anticipated harm. In a products-liability setting involving product 
design, the plaintiff’s burden of precaution against the harm can only 
be either adoption of a reasonable safer alternative design or a 
decision that, even absent an alternative design, the product should 
not have been marketed at all.53 
Up front, drawing from the discussion in the introduction to 
Section B of this Part, one of the most obvious hurdles is the textual focus 
on foreseeable and anticipated harms. Likewise, the consumer 
expectations test is no better.54 While the California model for the 
consumer expectations test articulated in Soule v. General Motors Corp. 
has retained some use, jurisdictions using the California model represent 
a considerable minority.55 In Soule, the California Supreme Court limited 
the consumer expectations test in design defect litigation, specifically in 
cases involving complex product designs. The court said: 
[A] complex product, even when it is being used as intended, may 
often cause injury in a way that does not engage its ordinary 
consumers’ reasonable minimum assumptions about safe 
performance. For example, the ordinary consumer of an automobile 
simply has “no idea” how it should perform in all foreseeable 
situations, or how safe it should be made against all foreseeable 
hazards. 
. . . . 
As we have seen, the consumer expectations test is reserved for cases 
in which the everyday experience of the product’s users permits a 
conclusion that the product’s design violated minimum safety 
assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert opinion about 
the merits of the design.56 
The remainder of consumer expectations jurisdictions simply hold 
that a product is defective if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that 
anticipated by the ordinary user, without distinction for the complexity of 
the product.57 Analyzing the consumer expectations test, Professor Mary 
J. Davis highlights three issues relevant in the immediate context: 
                                                     
 53. Id. 
 54. Notably, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS formally abandons the consumer 
expectations test for design defect claims. See id. § 2 cmt. g (“[C]onsumer expectations do not 
constitute an independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs.”). Nonetheless, 
the test is still used in certain jurisdictions. 
 55. See Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tenn. 1996). 
 56. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994). 
 57. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209 (Alaska 1998); Ontai v. Straub 
Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983); Malcom v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 217 P.3d 514 (Mont. 
2009); Kudlacek v. Fiat, 509 N.W.2d 603 (Neb. 1994). 
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Few courts adhere closely to the letter of section 402A’s consumer 
expectations test in proving design defect. The test has proved 
unworkable for a variety of reasons. First, it connotes a contract-
based liability, encouraging the jury to rely intuitively on principles 
of bargaining and warranty. Second, if the product contains a defect 
which is apparent or obvious, the consumer expectations arguably 
include the apparent danger, preventing liability and therefore 
discouraging product improvements which could easily and cost-
effectively alleviate the danger. Third, bystanders, who are widely 
recognized as protected by both tort and contract theories of products 
liability regardless of privity, cannot be said to have any expectations 
about a product which causes them injury.58 
Whether applying the risk-utility test, the model of the consumer 
expectations test outlined in Soule, or the more traditional consumer 
expectations test that does not expressly account for the complexity of the 
product, the introduction of reinforcement learning AI systems poses new 
challenges for both consumer-plaintiffs and defendant-manufacturers in 
design defect claims. Under the risk-utility test, consumer-plaintiffs must 
demonstrate the availability of a reasonable alternative design.59 Under 
both tests, both parties are required to litigate on the question of 
foreseeable consumer uses and harm.60 However, as previously discussed, 
the complexity of these underlying AI systems and their inherently 
evolutionary nature make demonstrating the availability of alternative 
                                                     
 58. Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1217, 1236–37 (1993). 
 59. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-2104 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996) (“If the design of 
a product or product component is in issue in a products liability action, the design shall be presumed 
to be reasonably safe unless, at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer, a practical 
and technically feasible alternative design was available that would have prevented the harm without 
significantly impairing the usefulness, desirability, or marketability of the product . . . .”), invalidated 
by Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56 (2018) (“A 
product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time the product left its manufacturer’s control: 
(1) There existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant’s 
damage; and (2) The likelihood that the product’s design would cause the claimant’s damage and the 
gravity of that damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design 
and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the product. An adequate 
warning about a product shall be considered in evaluating the likelihood of damage when the 
manufacturer has used reasonable care to provide the adequate warning to users and handlers of the 
product.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F) (West 2018) (“A product is not defective in design 
or formulation if, at the time the product left the control of its manufacturer, a practical and technically 
feasible alternative design or formulation was not available that would have prevented the harm for 
which the claimant seeks to recover compensatory damages without substantially impairing the 
usefulness or intended purpose of the product.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Welch Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. O & K Trojan, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ohio 1995) 
(“While a manufacturer is not responsible for all product misuses, failure to design a product to prevent 
a foreseeable misuse can be a design defect.”); Rife v. Hitachi Const. Mach. Co., 609 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 2005). 
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programming designs exceedingly difficult.61 Similarly, the fact that these 
programs are designed to interact and evolve with the user seriously 
challenges the traditional understanding and application of what harms 
and uses are foreseeable. 
2. “Available Alternative Design” and “Foreseeability” 
Which potential consumer–AI interactions (and subsequently 
acquired data) are foreseeable, and which corresponding obligations does 
a manufacturer have to mitigate against any potential derivative harm 
through an alternative design? Underpinning the questions of liability 
adhering to unreasonably dangerous design defects in AI systems is 
whether the product was used in a foreseeable manner that proximately led 
to the injury.62 While a specific AI may be designed to consider the user’s 
attention or intentions (such as a theoretical self-driving technology that 
learns a driver’s average response time), I argue, I think non-
controversially, that the corresponding, individual human decision-
making processes that these AI will inherently depend upon are 
notoriously flawed.63 It is only logical to assume that rational machines 
will experience some difficulty when interacting with occasionally 
irrational human actors and experience similar difficulties in mitigating 
the corresponding safety risks generated by irrational human decision-
making. 
Following traditional principals of products liability law, some may 
argue that it should fall upon the manufacturers of AI systems to fill the 
resulting foreseeability gap generated by these new programs. The 
manufacturers should predict and mitigate against the broad range of 
theoretically possible, but limitedly foreseeable, consumer data inputs that 
could give rise to potential harm. While apportioning this responsibility—
and any attendant liability—in this fashion mirrors current products 
liability theories, it is again critical to consider the precise nature of how 
reinforcement learning AI operate. The system takes original data inputs, 
identifies patterns, and subsequently creates new patterns in a recursive 
process, which are then applied to new data. Like a series of perpetually 
branching forks along a path, an AI system progresses through an iterative 
analytical process to identify and incorporate new information.64 The 
                                                     
 61. Frank, supra note 47. 
 62. Id. at 637. 
 63. Few readers will need to delve deep into their memory to recall a moment when they (or 
someone else) made an inarguably poor decision. With a reinforcement learning AI dependent on 
consumer input, such poor human decision-making will be integrated into the AI system’s learning 
process. 
 64. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 22, where Dr. Andrew Moore, writing as Dean of the School 
of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University, provides a succinct but helpful analysis of how 
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exponentially expansive number of variables raised by each new data input 
make it highly impractical for manufacturers to attempt to predict all 
individual potentialities. 
Across jurisdictions, tension already exists with respect to how issues 
of foreseeability are addressed, specifically in cases involving complex 
products. In most jurisdictions, the common defense for complex product 
manufacturers is the assertion that the product, at the time of sale, was 
“state of the art.”65 This term itself is subject to a multitude of practical 
definitions, from a meaning of “industry custom” or “industry practice,” 
to meaning “the safest existing technology that has been adopted for use,” 
to meaning “cutting-edge technology.”66 Regardless of the term’s specific 
application, the existence of a safer design that has been adopted and put 
to actual use is relevant to the question of whether a reasonable alternative 
design was available. 
Interconnected with the question of whether a product’s design was 
reasonably safe is the question of foreseeable use and harm. However, 
jurisdictional tensions exist here as well on the meaning of “foreseeable.” 
For example, under South Carolina law, the test of foreseeability is 
whether the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the 
complained-of act: for an act to be the proximate cause of the injury, the 
injury must be a foreseeable consequence of the act.67 However, although 
foreseeability of some injury resulting from the manufacturer’s act or 
omission is a prerequisite of proximate cause in South Carolina, the 
plaintiff need not prove that the manufacturer should have contemplated 
the specific event leading to the injury.68 In contrast, New Jersey applies a 
standard of objective foreseeability, which does not assign liability for 
future events that are only theoretically or just possibly foreseeable.69 
Foreseeability applies only to future occurrences that objectively and 
                                                     
the development of deep learning techniques in machine learning is increasing the ability of programs 
to automatically generate new models for large and complex data sets. 
 65. See, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (“State-
of-the-art would be an applicable factor in a design-defect case, if the alternative design suggested by 
the plaintiff was not practically feasible in light of the state of the art at the time the product was 
manufactured.”); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 299 (N.H. 1983) (finding that it was 
“both reasonable and constitutionally permissible to raise an affirmative defense based upon 
‘discoverability of risk’ as measured by the ‘state of the art’ at the time of distribution or sale”). 
 66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 2 cmt. d. 
 67. See Rife v. Hitachi Const. Mach. Co., 609 S.E.2d 565, 569 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 68. Id.; see also Speaks v. Mazda Motor Corp., 118 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1224 (D. Mont. 2015) 
(“[I]f it is reasonably foreseeable to a defendant that its product can be or is being used in a specific 
manner, and a consumer is injured by using the product in that manner, the defendant cannot argue 
that the plaintiff had misused its product.”) (quoting Kenser v. Premium Nail Concepts, Inc., 338 P.3d 
37, 43 (Mont. 2014)). 
 69. See Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 991 F. Supp. 390, 400–01 (D.N.J. 1997), 
aff’d, 189 F.3d 305 (1999). 
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reasonably could have been anticipated when a product was 
manufactured.70 
Under South Carolina law, AI manufacturers appear to be left 
considerably exposed to liability for injuries resulting from a wholly 
indeterminate body of potential consumer–AI interactions. Given that 
reinforcement learning AI systems are specifically intended to interact 
with the consumer (because the greater the number and diversity of those 
interactions will, theoretically, provide better data), will the law hold that 
these manufacturers have effectively programmed themselves into a legal 
corner where they have de facto “foreseen” these interactions? How many 
iterative learning cycles, consumer–AI interactions, or years must pass 
before the consumer’s use and injury is deemed too speculative to be 
foreseeable? 
Conversely, under New Jersey law, consumers face huge evidentiary 
hurdles to effectively prove their use and injury were objectively 
foreseeable. While particularly problematic for consumers, AI product 
liability litigation also poses an incredible challenge for manufacturers and 
the courts. Given both the complexity of these programs and the fact that 
plaintiffs in design defect cases will need to establish both that the program 
was unreasonably dangerous as to be legally defective and that the alleged 
defect was the proximate cause of their injury, it is conceivably 
unavoidable that virtually all AI products liability litigation will require 
expert testimony and similarly burdensome discovery.71 Beyond the cost 
implications of hiring expert witnesses, the evolving nature of AI 
reinforcement learning programs pose new challenges not inherent in 
traditional computer software and software litigation. Simply tracing and 
identifying the specific data inputs and subsequent program developments 
allegedly proximately responsible for the plaintiff’s act and injury may 
prove too challenging or cost prohibitive for individual plaintiffs seeking 
small to moderate recovery in many cases.72 
3. Consumer Alteration and Misuse 
Another area of complexity that reinforcement learning AI programs 
introduce into existing products liability law is the issue of consumer 
alteration and misuse. To what extent may a manufacturer argue that 
consumer alteration is an intervening cause when the product in question 
is expressly designed and marketed for aftermarket consumer alteration? 
State by state treatment of these products liability theories demonstrate the 
                                                     
 70. Id. 
 71. See generally Frank, supra note 47 (addressing the general complexities of litigating design 
defect claims over computer software). 
 72. See id.; see also discussion infra pp. 19–21 (addressing plaintiffs’ potential cost burdens). 
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potential complexities. Specifically, where product alteration or misuse is 
involved, individual jurisdictions have held that the manufacturer is liable 
for those injuries that were foreseeable, preventable, or mitigatable.73 Will 
the fact that reinforcement learning AI are designed for alternation 
effectively remove this defense provided that the plaintiff-consumers are 
using the product as marketed?74 How may well intentioned but grievously 
incompetent user interactions that fall outside of the manufacturers 
proscribed list of uses be evaluated by the court? I believe a proactive 
legislative approach that considers these questions as part of its 
apportionment of liability could help mitigate these issues. 
III. PROHIBITIVE COSTS OF EXPERT LITIGATION 
Another immediate issue raised by the involvement of reinforcement 
learning AI programs in products liability cases is cost. With the exception 
of a per se liability standard for defendant-manufacturers, 
consumer-plaintiffs who suffer tortious injury from a reinforcement 
learning AI program-based product may be required to demonstrate that 
                                                     
 73. See Arcadian Corp., 991 F. Supp. at 400; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-3(a) (West 2018) 
(“No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable in any product liability action where a 
proximate cause of the personal injury, death, or damage to property was either an alteration or 
modification of the product by a party other than the manufacturer or seller, which alteration or 
modification occurred after the product left the control of such manufacturer or such seller unless: (1) 
The alteration or modification was in accordance with the instructions or specifications of such 
manufacturer or such seller; or (2) The alteration or modification was made with the express consent 
of such manufacturer or such seller.”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01.3-03 (West 2018) (“No 
manufacturer or seller of a product may be held liable in any products liability action in which a 
substantial contributing cause of the injury, death, or damage to property was an alteration or 
modification of the product, which occurred subsequent to the sale by the manufacturer or seller to the 
initial user or consumer, and which changed the purpose, use, function, design, or intended use or 
manner of use of the product from that for which the product was originally designed, tested, or 
intended.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-108 (West 2018) (“If a product is not unreasonably dangerous 
at the time it leaves the control of the manufacturer or seller but was made unreasonably dangerous by 
subsequent unforeseeable alteration, change, improper maintenance or abnormal use, the manufacturer 
or seller is not liable.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-705 (West 2018) (“[F]ault shall include an 
alteration or modification of the product, which occurred subsequent to the sale by the manufacturer 
or seller to the initial user or consumer, and which changed the purpose, use, function, design, or 
intended use or manner of use of the product from that for which the product was originally designed, 
tested, or intended.”); see also Lindholm v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 862 F.3d 648, 652 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that under South Dakota law while manufacturers can be liable for a customer’s reasonably 
foreseeable misuse, a manufacturer cannot be liable for misuse that it cannot reasonably anticipate); 
Ervin v. Cont’l Conveyor & Equip. Co., 674 F. Supp. 2d 709, 724 (D.S.C. 2009) (holding that under 
South Carolina law “liability may be imposed upon a manufacturer or seller notwithstanding [the 
consumer’s] subsequent alteration of product when the alteration could have been anticipated by the 
manufacturer or seller”) (internal citation omitted). 
 74. Were a consumer to deliberately alter the product by accessing and altering its programming 
or, more traditionally, by misusing the product in a manner warned against in the product’s warranty, 
there is no reason to assume such consumer alterations or misuse would not still be an available 
defense. 
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the injury was caused by the flawed programming installed by the 
manufacturer, not by their faulty, negligent or unprescribed use, input, or 
“teachings.” However, such proof will almost invariably need to be 
offered through expert witnesses. 
Current estimates for products liability expert witnesses in 
Washington run at approximately $250 per hour for initial case review and 
approximately $275 per hour for depositions and court appearance fees.75 
For computer expert witnesses in Washington, estimates are higher at 
approximately $350 per hour for initial case review and over $400 per hour 
for deposition and trial testimony.76 However, expert witness costs can 
easily surpass over $1,000 per hour, with case totals reaching into the six 
figures after accounting for the cost of discovery and data analysis.77 Given 
both the virtual requirement for expert analysis in any products liability 
claims rooted in AI programming error and the high costs these experts 
run, many individual plaintiffs with small to moderate claims may be 
cost-barred from pursuing their claims absent some fee shifting provision 
or other legislative action.78 
As noted by Bryant Smith in his analysis of automotive-based AI and 
existing liability models: 
[R]equiring the plaintiff to specifically demonstrate how and why an 
automated driving system performed poorly and should have 
performed better could impose technical and financial barriers to 
many claims, especially those involving comparatively minor 
injuries. On the other hand, permitting the plaintiff to use the 
consumer expectations test, the malfunction doctrine, or res ipsa 
loquitor could make it easier to attribute undesirable outcomes to 
something within the automated driving system. In that case, the 
defendant automaker, rather than the plaintiff, might offer a more 
detailed explanation of the automated driving system’s performance 
in order to shift some costs to other parties.79 
                                                     
 75. Expert Witness Fee Calculator, EXPERT INST., https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/expert-
witness-fees/ [https://perma.cc/3KEX-4C3E]. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Marc Davis, For an Expert Witness, Consider Reputation, Location, and Cost, ABA J. (Nov. 
2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/choosing_expert_witness [https://perma.cc/ 
4GAK-QSFW]. 
 78. Additionally, I think it is worth noting that many AI products liability claims similar to the 
kind discussed in this Comment may often not be amenable to class action procedures. Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(a) requires, in part, that a prospective class demonstrate both commonality and 
typicality. Given the special user–AI interactions central to reinforcement learning design, I believe 
many claims will naturally require individual, fact-specific inquiries into the consumer’s particular 
product use, defeating class commonality and typicality. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 79. Smith, supra note 4, at 51–52. 
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Given the complex nature of AI programming, it seems inescapable 
that parties in almost all cases will need to rely on expert testimony. These 
costs may very well prove prohibitive to consumer-plaintiffs—even those 
with strong cases. While fee-shifting statutes may offer some relief, the 
possibility of footing the bill for not one, but two expert witnesses may 
still drive consumer-plaintiffs with real injuries and valid claims from 
pursuing litigation. Unregulated and unbalanced, these high costs may 
drive many consumer-plaintiffs to settle, ultimately disincentivizing 
manufacturers of flawed AI-based products from making necessary, 
injury-preventing changes. Rather than waiting for the courts or the 
plaintiffs’ bar to adapt to these rising challenges, proactive government 
action is better suited to ensure legitimate future claims do not go 
unresolved. 
CONCLUSION 
In concluding their public apology for Tay’s failures, Microsoft 
offered a guarded yet aspirational analysis of both the fundamental 
challenges of AI programming and the future of AI–human interaction. 
AI systems feed off of both positive and negative interactions with 
people. In that sense, the challenges are just as much social as they 
are technical. We will do everything possible to limit technical 
exploits but also know we cannot fully predict all possible human 
interactive misuses without learning from mistakes. To do AI right, 
one needs to iterate with many people and often in public forums.80 
The AI–consumer interactive element at the heart of Tay’s design is 
emblematic of the many possible ways that consumers can expect 
increased engagement with new AI technology in the coming years.81 As 
these emerging AI products are inherently dependent on direct AI–
consumer interactions to be functional—let alone successful—both the 
industry and the legal field need to begin making a conscious effort to 
better understand when, where, and how risk and liability are being 
apportioned.82 
As the AI industry continues to grow and develop at breakneck 
speeds, the tension between the new realities of AI–consumer interactions 
                                                     
 80. Lee, supra note 13. 
 81. Notably, three key elements distinguish Tay from the reinforcement learning AI systems 
discussed in this Comment: the number of disassociated users supplying data to a single AI system, 
the deliberately negative character of the data supplied, and the atypical nature of the resulting harm. 
Tay’s story is illustrative of the capabilities and general function of the AI technology in question, not 
the corresponding liability analysis. 
 82. Absent these discussions, these programs will continue to enter the market in a legal vacuum, 
and the public and consumers will be left to hope that developers and manufacturers will choose 
prudence over profits. See Metz, supra note 18. 
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and traditional liability laws will likewise grow, potentially threatening the 
viability of an invaluable industry. Pitfalls, both new and old, pose unique 
challenges. Traditional concerns, such as the failure of manufacturers to 
conduct diligent product testing and analysis, can lead to disastrous results 
for both consumers and manufacturers alike. Businesses will always worry 
about the liability lurking in an increasingly unforeseeable future driven 
by AI programs. Products liability laws must still function to protect the 
consumer from harm by encouraging businesses to act appropriately to 
mitigate against foreseeable risks. Nonetheless, the ability of traditional 
products liability laws to maintain this balance is drawn into serious 
question by the advent of new technologies that redefine the relationship 
between manufacturer, consumer, and product.83 
While conceptually intriguing, the current emphasis on AI autonomy 
and the law of agency is too limited in its practical application to account 
for the current trajectory of recent advancements in AI technology and the 
relationship between these products and their consumers. By effectively 
attributing de facto liability to manufacturers of non-autonomous AI 
systems, a generalized agent-principal analysis ignores the complexity of 
the relationship between manufacturers, consumers, and AI systems. As a 
growing number of reinforcement learning AI products are specifically 
created for aftermarket consumer interaction, manufacturers cannot avoid 
sacrificing their ability to mitigate foreseeable harm while consumers face 
an increasingly insurmountable evidentiary burden to establishing the 
proximate cause of their injuries, even under strict liability models. It is 
not unheard of for the legal system to respond to specific industries or 
products with specialized statutes.84 Rather than bending over backwards 
to apply existing products liability laws or permitting the haphazard 
growth of industry-specific AI liability regimes, state, legal, and political 
professionals should heed the counsel of industry experts and work 
proactively to adopt a tailored model that reflects the emergent reality of 
today’s AI.85 
                                                     
 83. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 2 cmt. a. 
 84. Perhaps one of the best examples is with respect to laws regarding asbestos. See., e.g., 
Asbestos v. Bordelon, Inc., 726 So. 2d 926, 941 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (“Under Halphen, the 
plaintiffs . . . are not required to provide a showing of the manufacturer’s negligence in a products 
liability case, but rather must establish the manufacturer’s legal relationship to the ‘defective’ product. 
Consequently, the manufacturer cannot offer his knowledge or lack thereof concerning the condition 
of the product as a method to exonerate it from liability.”). 
 85. Hearings, supra note 1. In addition to the statements by Dr. Horvitz and Dr. Moore, Mr. 
Brockman and Dr. Steve Chin, the Technical Group Supervisor of the Artificial Intelligence Group 
and the Senior Research Scientist in the Mission Planning and Execution Section at NASA’s Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, specifically raised the need for and importance of further involvement from 
the legal and political communities to help sustain and grow America’s Artificial Intelligence 
industries. Id. 
